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## Loyalism and Peacebuilding in the 2000s<sup>1</sup>

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### Introduction

It could be argued that the Northern Irish conflict has been successfully settled by antagonistic groups entering a process of dialogue with one another. Yet, observers point that the process as it has been designed failed to develop a culture of democracy involving such mechanisms as debates, discussions, disagreement, compromise and cooperation. Besides, recent events led Wilson to concluding that the rationales provided by the paramilitaries still remain meaningful for many.<sup>2</sup> Some observers pushed the argument further by stating that a link existed between the way the peacemaking process had been designed and the increase in intercommunal tensions and violence. For example, Wilson and Wilford noted in 2003 that ‘the sobering conclusion must be that at best the agreement has had a neutral effect on communal division – and, at worst, that perversely it has exacerbated it’.<sup>3</sup> The thrust of their argument was that some of the leading principles of the various peace agreements (notably the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and the 2006 St Andrews Agreement) did not question the segregationist culture prevalent in Northern Ireland.

In the same vein, I contend that the policy-making framework in which strategies aiming at building peace<sup>4</sup> have been designed has had an impact on the efficiency of the peace process in general. To all appearances, peace has not been stabilised. Different forms of violent or aggressive behaviours continue to exist. If traditional paramilitary activities lessened in the 2000s, Hansson stated in 2005 that ‘young people in interface areas continue to be involved in sporadic outbreaks of violence or disturbances’.<sup>5</sup> Intimidation through street violence and rioting is still a prevalent form of social interaction. Leonard pointed out that in North Belfast they shared a ‘sense of inevitability and permanence about the conflict’.<sup>6</sup> Mechanisms such as rioting still represent a necessary, efficient mode of action that permits to assert one’s rights.<sup>7</sup> Peace, as it stands, remains fragile.<sup>8</sup> Different studies have shown that young people in deprived areas are still affected by cross-community tensions, sectarianism and social exclusion in the 2000s.<sup>9</sup> Intercommunal tensions have not decreased despite the ongoing process of political dialogue and an array of public policies aiming at improving community relations.

I previously studied one particular policy aiming at building peace in Northern Ireland between 1969 and 1998 – the community relations policies – and concluded that, over the years, the policy-making framework consistently focused on some aspects at the expense of others. Most notably, peace initiatives in the community sector<sup>10</sup> and the objective of structural change<sup>11</sup> have been disregarded. One of the unforeseen consequences is that the feeling of marginalisation as expressed by some groups and individuals prevails and is even exacerbated on some occasions. The underlying assumption here is that the very conditions in which peacebuilding policies have been designed and implemented have generated unforeseen, paradoxical effects.

This essay will study peacebuilding initiatives launched at grassroots level by loyalists in the 2000s. I will analyse their impact on the community, as well as their strengths and weaknesses. Eventually, I will draw attention to the unequal relationship binding top-level and grassroots peacebuilding strategies and raise the question of the impact of that unbalanced relationship on the outcomes of the peace process in general.

## Loyalists and the peace process in the 2000s

Peacebuilding is a general term encompassing a wide range of activities. In this essay, it refers to a particular sub-group of initiatives involving paramilitaries and seeking to reflect on and transform military modes of action and organisation. Such activities have developed in the 2000s, although my own doctoral thesis has shown that they also existed in the late 1960s and the 1970s. They were then called ‘facilitation’ activities and were led mainly, but not exclusively, by community workers employed by the Community Relations Commission (1969–1974).<sup>12</sup> The objectives of facilitation, also called ‘political’ peacebuilding in this essay, are twofold. They aim at transforming violent modes of action (based on intimidation) and they seek to find reliable, satisfactory ways of multiplying the links between the paramilitary activists and outside partners (paramilitary or non-paramilitary). This may be called ‘structural’ or ‘political’ peacebuilding. This essay will also shed light on an alternative form of peacebuilding developed by community activists and former combatants in loyalist areas, which aims at tackling social imbalances. It will be referred to as ‘social’ peacebuilding.

This essay will focus on two such projects developed separately in the 2000s on the one hand by members of the UDA’s (Ulster Defence Association) think tank, the UPRG (Ulster Political Research Group),<sup>13</sup> and on the other hand by the PUP (Progressive Unionist Party) and the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force).<sup>14</sup> This essay will show that particular forms of peacebuilding activities involving members of the loyalist paramilitary groups and local community groups have been set up in the 2000s. Two particular initiatives will be studied: the East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum (EACTF, set up

in 2005) and the Standing Northern Ireland Peacebuilding Process (SNIPP, launched in 2007).

In the situation that developed after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (1998), loyalists sensed that their identity was in decline. There was a widespread feeling among unionists in general that they were losing ground in terms of cultural assertiveness in Northern Ireland<sup>15</sup> They also felt increasingly dismayed as the peace process looked to them to be one-sided in favour of Nationalists. Besides, the wider context of the peace process involved the reconstruction in Northern Ireland of a political culture around the principles of power-sharing and cross-community accord at a regional level (power-sharing assembly). Loyalists felt that they were left behind from those developments.

Overall, loyalist leaders from a paramilitary background, and the working-class communities they seek to represent, suffer from multiple factors of marginalisation, political under-representation standing as one of the main debilitating elements. If overlooked, this issue can lead to nurturing antagonistic discourses and to lessening the chances of developing loyalist and nationalist exchanges. A leadership that remains isolated tends to encourage aggressive behaviours among its followers. Thus, for loyalist leaders, developing their own political credo and new forms of non-violent action in the 2000s is important in order to be able to engage in peace efforts.

Political under-representation in loyalist areas is due to internal as well as external factors. Externally, loyalist supporters, instead of voting for emerging loyalist community leaders, generally vote for members of the two main unionist parties, the UUP (Ulster Unionist Party) or the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party), believing it more important to preserve unionist unity in order to defeat republicanism, all the more so as Sinn Féin gradually became the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland in the aftermath of the signing of the GFA. Under such circumstances, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a majority of people in loyalist areas turned to the DUP for support, given that this was considered a more reliable alternative to an assuaged UUP, who accepted to deal with nationalists and the British and Irish governments to help establish the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive.

The issues affecting the loyalist community became more pressing following the signing of the St Andrews Agreement in 2006. It was signed by representatives of the British and Irish governments and endorsed by the political parties of Northern Ireland, including the two main parties DUP and Sinn Féin, in order to set in place measures for the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly. DUP members agreed to abide by power-sharing principles in the Northern Ireland Assembly and to form a new Executive with the republicans, whereas the republicans agreed to support the new Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the courts and rule of law. Many loyalists felt betrayed by the DUP going into government with Sinn Féin as, since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, the DUP had opposed all

attempts at cross-community peacebuilding. Now, the DUP was going into government with Sinn Féin and many loyalists felt that they had been used by the DUP simply to gain electoral power.

Such a feeling of mistrust towards unionist and loyalist political representatives has been latent since the 1970s.<sup>16</sup> Sean Brennan underlines that ‘many grassroots leaders in the loyalist community were suspicious of the DUP who were quick to use loyalist leaders at times of crises only to dismiss them as “gangsters” and “criminal drug dealers” when the crises had passed’.<sup>17</sup> Besides, scholars have shown that loyalist paramilitaries have tried, at different times since 1969, to develop a proper political expression in defiance of mainstream unionism.<sup>18</sup> For instance, the UVF set up a political party in 1979, the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), whose members developed a discourse defending the interests of the Protestant working classes. Sarah Nelson argues that they ‘wanted change, disliked overt sectarianism and sought to involve Protestant workers in an independent movement’.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, the UDA set in place a political party in 1981, the Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), which is now extinct, even though they still have a think tank called the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG). However, historical developments since the 1970s have shown that there is limited ground for development for paramilitary leaders as political representatives. There are still many barriers preventing loyalist leaders from becoming elected representatives, which would eventually enable them to become a stable political force. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that mainstream unionists have sought to marginalise them.<sup>20</sup>

Internal reasons render the situation more complicated. The study of the attempts made by loyalist paramilitaries to find political expression since the 1960s sheds light on a couple of peculiar aspects of loyalism. First, it appears that the loyalist leaders involved in the political initiatives mentioned above hold at times liberal views on such matters as power-sharing (both the UDP<sup>21</sup> and the PUP supported the Good Friday Agreement). Loyalist activists involved in the PUP consider themselves to be ‘progressive’ on social and political issues.<sup>22</sup> They promote anti-sectarianism and pluralism.

But, when articulated, liberal loyalism does not gain systematic support either from the working-class communities it seeks to represent or from the members of the paramilitary groups from which it emanates. This is one of the main paradoxes of loyalism. McAuley explains:

In promoting these views [in favour of the creation of a Council of the British Isles] the UDP took two seats through the special arrangements made around the Forum following the elections of 1996. When the first elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly eventually took place, however, the DUP failed to have any representative elected, whereas the PUP secured two seats. Moreover, the distance between the UDP and the electorate was apparent. Further, even within the UDA’s own membership there was little evidence of support for the UDP.<sup>23</sup>

UDP's leadership became contested by less liberal members of the UDA. Graham Spencer also noted that the rhetorics of community defence were often manipulated by loyalist leaders to achieve an individual gain.<sup>24</sup>

On the republican side, Sinn Féin took part in the negotiations preceding the 1998 Agreement and supported its implementation. The IRA were also in favour of the GFA. They committed themselves to decommissioning their weapons and eventually began this process in 2001. The Independent International Commission on Decommissioning stated that the PIRA had fully decommissioned in September 2005. At first sight, one could expect such developments to nullify the *raison d'être* of the loyalist paramilitaries from the UVF and the UDA, as their action was partly prompted by the need to defend their people against republican violence. As this has largely been non-existent since the 1997 ceasefire (except for recent attacks by republican dissidents),<sup>25</sup> military action has become less relevant for loyalists. Recently, the International Decommissioning Body announced that both groups had completely decommissioned their weapons (the UVF in September 2009 and the UDA in January 2010). This raises the question of alternative modes of action and organisation for the loyalist leaders whose *raison d'être* has been linked to the existence of such paramilitary organisations. These factors shaped the situation in which peacebuilding activities developed between loyalist paramilitaries and local community groups.

However, whilst the political context has been important, another element has contributed to encouraging loyalist paramilitary leaders to get involved in peacebuilding activities. As a result of an increasing influx of European monies dedicated to peacebuilding, particularly through the Reconciliation for Sustainable Peace programme of Peace II from 2000, communities have been encouraged to 'develop strategies and activities which promote reconciliation as a means to sustaining peace'.<sup>26</sup> This has invigorated community activism, particularly in deprived areas, whether Nationalist or Unionist. Combined with a growing interest from scholars in the state of loyalism,<sup>27</sup> this has led to the emergence of clusters of people concerned with the issues affecting loyalist leaders and communities since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Through the examples of UDA's and UVF's engagement in peacebuilding, it will be argued that it is the rapprochement between loyalist paramilitary leaders and community activists that has enabled the former to engage in a 'structural' process seeking to transform their modes of action and organisation. Working in collaboration with community groups has enabled loyalist leaders to break out of isolation and to engage in peacebuilding. But what exactly does peacebuilding mean for UDA and UVF leaders?

## Peacebuilding involving paramilitary leaders

Sensing that they would have to adjust to new circumstances in the near future, loyalist leaders within the UDA and the UVF separately started pondering alternative modes of action in the early 2000s. Three key issues were at stake, all revolving around the question of their position in the community as 'genuine', consented leaders, away from their former role as self-proclaimed protectors of the community. In order to address the issue of the legitimacy of their position as leaders in the post-GFA circumstances, loyalists had to reconsider their paramilitary *raison d'être*, address the problem of under-representation in political and public spheres and connect with the 'community', that is to say the people whom they sought to represent and lead. The initiatives that will be depicted in this study must be seen as attempts at dealing with the three issues simultaneously, sometimes leading to confusion as social and political objectives intermingle. For example, in November 2007, the UDA declared in their Remembrance Day Statement that

At present up to 60% of our community do not vote or do not register to vote and languish in the top 10% [sic] of the most socially and economically deprived communities in the country. This leaves our people isolated, marginalised and open to exploitation and not able to defend ourselves from politicians who would seek to improve their political carriers [sic] and criminals in particular drug dealers.

If we are to create a society where citizens feel they should not be defended by paramilitaries then we must have political structures that protect all the citizens and where politicians can not jump in and out of those political structures when it suits them to further their own political aims. The people must have confidence in the political structures and feel they will be defended if wronged. That feeling does not exist in our community.

We feel that some Irish nationalist politicians along with others are intent on excluding our people from the new-shared [sic] future that is the over arching [sic] principle for the new Assembly. They are working at every turn to erode our British identity and undermining the Union. What we do recognise is that we must face these challenges within the law and through non-violent means. What compounds this situation is that we feel the majority of Unionist politicians are unable to defend our rights at present but recognise that politics in the new assembly are very much in transition.<sup>28</sup>

This extract illustrated the UDA's dual ambition to defy both republicans (who were the main nationalist party in the Assembly) and Unionist and Loyalist politicians from the main parties (the UUP and DUP). They were also willing to develop a new strategy in order to achieve the three objectives mentioned above (to end paramilitary activities, to engage in the wider political arena and to contribute to the development of their community).

According to the main line of work that was adopted, peacebuilding activities in loyalist spheres could take on either a 'social' or a 'political' hue. On the one hand, 'social' peacebuilding focused on the improvement of living conditions in deprived areas by setting in place local self-help projects. 'Political' peacebuilding, on the other hand, sought to investigate the question of the nature and state of leadership. This process might, in turn, reinforce the former combatants' commitment in a sustainable and long-term peacebuilding activity. It was implied that a better knowledge of leadership mechanisms would contribute to making the peacebuilding process meaningful and effective to those leaders who had felt excluded from it. 'Political' or 'structural' peacebuilding was analogous to what is also called, at times, 'facilitation'.

As we will now see, the conditions in which peacebuilding activities developed in the two loyalist spheres (the UDA and UPRG and the UVF and PUP) bore similarities. Both initiatives were designed and led by community leaders and they were the result of a rapprochement between loyalist combatants (or former combatants) and community activists in a context of changing circumstances.

As a first step, in the mid-2000s, the two paramilitary groups launched consultation processes within their rank and file to discuss the future of the organisations. An internal consultation was organised by the UVF in 2004.<sup>29</sup> Meetings were held to discuss the future of paramilitary activities. As Edwards indicates, 'This was undertaken in a variety of forums and ranged from one-to-one contacts between the leadership and the rank-and-file to larger "roadshow" gatherings in loyalist social clubs and bars.'<sup>30</sup> Eventually, the principles of conflict transformation were endorsed in 2004 and 2005 by the UVF and the PUP. At the same time, a community-based programme was set in place in East Antrim (a loyalist stronghold) in order to address the issues affecting local communities in Rathcoole, Monkstown, New Mossley, Carrickfergus and Larne. The overall aim was to deal with the conditions which gave rise to paramilitary activity by addressing the 'fears and anxieties'<sup>31</sup> of loyalist communities in those areas.

In parallel, in a statement issued in November 2004,<sup>32</sup> a group of loyalist leaders from the UDA assembled through the UPRG articulated new lines of action which were aimed at creating a situation whereby the UDA would no longer be required to exist as armed defenders of their community. This implied that they were seeking to create the conditions that would eventually invalidate the paramilitaries' mode of action. Around 2005, loyalist leaders within the UDA and the UPRG then decided to consult their members and engage in a process which would lead to the transformation of loyalism and contribute to a more peaceful society. A sample of opinions and reactions expressed during the consultation process were published by Farset Community Think Tank Project with the aim of opening up the debate to a broader section of the loyalist community and to mobilise them around the issue of the possible changes to their modes of action.<sup>33</sup> This led to the creation of a

group called Conflict Transformation Initiative (CTI): Loyalism in Transition. According to CTI, the loyalist community faced a certain number of issues which had not been addressed by recent peacebuilding initiatives. They mentioned specifically the predominance of the feelings of disaffection and marginalisation within loyalist communities which had been growing since the signing of the GFA. They perceived that the structures and programmes set up following the Agreement did not take into consideration the needs of the loyalist community. CTI underlined the alienation of loyalist youth and ex-combatants. They also pointed out the absence of an effective political representation for local loyalist communities.<sup>34</sup>

Interestingly, Seán Brennan testifies that loyalist communities suffered from multiple factors of marginalisation owing to their image as 'paramilitaries'. He explains that

What is often forgotten is that working class Protestant areas suffered as much from poverty, alienation and deprivation as Nationalist ones. People from these poor Protestant areas, especially paramilitaries and former politically motivated ex-prisoners were considered 'the lowest of the low, scum' even by other Protestants. They were social pariahs and felt abandoned.<sup>35</sup>

If finding a job and becoming 'electable' were difficult for many people living in loyalist communities, it was all the more so for former combatants (also called 'politically motivated ex-prisoners'). Precisely, the latter played an important role in triggering the consultation processes.<sup>36</sup> For instance, the PUP and the group of former prisoners, EPIC (Ex-Prisoners Interpretative Centre), started developing new strategies from the late 1990s. PUP representatives stated in the *Principles of Loyalism* (2002) document that 'The process started for many volunteers when they personally acknowledged that violent responses to conflict were simply leading us further and further into an unending cycle of violence and counter-violence. Upon their release from prison they committed themselves to non-violent activism.'<sup>37</sup>

As stated earlier, grassroots peacebuilding activities developed thanks to an increasing influx of European subsidies dedicated to peacebuilding. Between 2000 and 2004, the European programme for Peace and Reconciliation received a total allocation of 834 million Euros.<sup>38</sup> In Northern Ireland, 8,300 projects<sup>39</sup> had received grants by December 2004 both in Nationalist and Unionist areas.<sup>40</sup> As a consequence, grassroots initiatives flourished, particularly in deprived areas. Loyalist leaders themselves, under the influence of 'politically motivated' ex-prisoners, began to develop peacebuilding strategies mixing social and political objectives. Such projects provided employment for ex-prisoners. Seán Brennan explains:

Many loyalists saw the positive impact grassroots conflict transformation projects were having in republican areas and wanted similar projects set up in their areas. Especially as grassroots conflict transformation projects



offered prospects of employment for former loyalist prisoners who were struggling to find jobs due to their prison records.<sup>41</sup>

As support to community groups increased thanks to European programmes, so did their working ambit. Accordingly, a rapprochement took place between community activists and loyalist leaders from the UVF and PUP and the UDA and UPRG and led to the launch of different processes aiming at transforming loyalism: the UVF got involved in the East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum (EACTF) and the UDA and UPRG in the Standing Northern Ireland Peacebuilding Process (SNIPP). We shall now look more closely at each initiative.

### The East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum (EACTF)

In the early 2000s, community worker Kelly Haggarty and Billy Mitchell from LINC (Local Initiatives for Needy Communities), a Belfast-based community group linked to the Church of the Nazarene (Evangelicals), devised a conflict transformation strategy for loyalist areas in East Antrim. Haggarty explains:

Billy [Mitchell] was absolutely passionate and committed to conflict transformation, he wanted to affect a change in the wider East Antrim constituency (which was my area of work at the time). Billy also had credibility within the ranks of the UVF, as well as the PUP. That, coupled with our in-depth knowledge and capability, created a perfect platform from which to project the theories and practices of conflict transformation to a wider, more inclusive audience.<sup>42</sup>

Other practitioners in conflict transformation joined in. So did the local Battalion Commander of the UVF. A local East Antrim Commander explained:

I would buy into that [EACTF] approach 100%. The PUP, at the minute, I don't think it is going anywhere: it hasn't got support from our own people. Many of the younger ones in the UVF simply don't vote. There is a fear of putting your name on the electoral register and fear of having their benefits taken away. The DUP has no interest in us – the UUP has no interest – so practically we have no voice. The only voice therefore is through the community work. We have been neglected and marginalised over the years. It's up to us now to devise and develop our own programmes; it's up to us to help our own people in the area.<sup>43</sup>

In February 2005, the East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum (EACTF) was set up in order to address local needs affecting loyalist communities in Rathcoole, Monkstown, New Mossley, Carrickfergus and Larne. A focus group, bringing together founding members (Haggarty, Mitchell, Bloomer, Edwards and the battalion commander for the UVF) oversaw the work of the East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum (EACTF). The Focus Group brought together 'active paramilitaries, former UVF prisoners, PUP members,

community activists, and “critical friends” from faith-based groups and academia’.<sup>44</sup> Its mission was ‘To establish and co-ordinate a strategic plan to help enrich and enhance the quality of life for people living within loyalist communities. To help address and remedy those negative aspects of loyalism that undermines [sic] the security, safety and social and economic development of their communities.’<sup>45</sup> Academics and observers from the civil society were also welcome in the process: ‘The Focus Group will seek to encourage Critical Friends from civic society to assist it in developing its strategy by providing critical analysis, drawing in appropriate expertise and evaluating the process.’<sup>46</sup>

After its inception, the Focus Group claimed that ‘over 100 people’ were ‘actively involved’<sup>47</sup> in their activities. According to a progress report, their main areas of work entailed securing funding<sup>48</sup> in order to employ a coordinator and to provide resources for local groups, but also organising dialogue sessions and standing conferences involving community workers, loyalist leaders, observers and representatives from statutory bodies.<sup>49</sup> This was in line with what has been described here as ‘social’ peacebuilding<sup>50</sup> and corresponded to the method of community development as it was originally advocated in the 1970s by members of the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission (1969–1974). At that time, the Commission’s first director Hywel Griffiths introduced the approach of community development (CD) in Northern Ireland. This encouraged people most affected by conflicts to engage in an analysis of their problems, to define who had responsibility for such problems and to design non-violent modes of action that might contribute to improving their conditions. The overall goal of Griffiths’ strategy consisted in strengthening some aspects of the community (social, economic, environment) in order to be able to reach out to other communities who faced the same difficulties.

In Northern Ireland, this meant encouraging community groups in republican and loyalist areas to share their experiences and eventually work together. Even though the Commission was disbanded abruptly in 1974, this approach of community development continued to exist, albeit in many different forms, much of it through some of the Community Relations Commission’s (1969–1974) former field workers. Thus, the principles of community self-help and empowerment, which had been advocated by members of the Commission in the 1970s and have remained a benchmark for many, resurfaced in loyalist areas in the changing circumstances of the 2000s.

## The Standing Northern Ireland Peacebuilding Process (SNIPP)

The UPRG and UDA leaders also sought external help and expertise to conduct their own transformation initiative in the early 2000s. They got in touch with grassroots activists involved in community development and conflict resolu-

tion in Belfast, namely the Farset project and MICOM, who were regarded as a trustworthy form of grassroots leadership. MICOM's objective then became to 'design, set in place, and facilitate the transition process'.<sup>51</sup>

MICOM (Moldovan Initiative Committee of Management) originated in the 1990s when Joe Camplisson, a conflict resolution expert from Belfast, got involved in a peacebuilding experience in a former region of the Soviet Union which had become an independent country, Moldova.<sup>52</sup> Now a sovereign state, Moldova is engaged in an armed conflict with the separatist region of Transdnistria (supported by Russia). Camplisson soon assembled a group of people in Northern Ireland to help Moldovans and Transdnistrians enhance peacebuilding efforts. The approach was based on a principle dear to John Burton,<sup>53</sup> according to which the people most affected by the conflict have to go through a preliminary stage of problem definition. That is part of the 'analytical method' of conflict resolution. It is through their own analysis that participants in peacebuilding can perceive what the problems are. Camplisson adds, 'Often it boils down to significant identity needs, which are not necessarily expressed through political, social or economic issues, but through the symbols which people want to have in place. So the question becomes one of how they can satisfy those identity needs without coming into conflict with others.'<sup>54</sup>

MICOM's director Camplisson involved community leaders from Belfast, mainly loyalists, to assist him in helping Moldovans and Transdnistrians experience an assisted needs analysis. The group called Local Community Initiative (LCI) conducted conflict resolution workshops based on John Burton's idea of an analytical method, as it has been depicted above.<sup>55</sup> Then, Camplisson's team in Moldova invited members of the Moldovan and Transdnistrian groups to visit Northern Ireland in March 1996.<sup>56</sup> At that stage, many community leaders and political representatives from both sides in Northern Ireland were involved. As a result of their engagement in this work, the group LCI strengthened and started asking itself if and how the methods applied in Moldova could be workable in Northern Ireland.

Given that MICOM invited grassroots activists and former combatants from Northern Ireland to assist in the Moldovan initiative, MICOM became a natural partner for the loyalist leaders who sought to engage in a similar transformation process in their own area in the 2000s. A key element of that partnership lay in the relationship of trust that had gradually developed between members of MICOM and some loyalist leaders throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. This background description of the main actors of the SNIPP initiative enables us to grasp a very important aspect related to the involvement of most SNIPP participants in some sort of grassroots activism in Northern Ireland since the 1960s. Joe Camplisson, for instance, has been involved in different sorts of grassroots activities, such as facilitation between paramilitaries of both sides, since 1969. He was also a member of the initial team of field workers in the first body to deal with issues of conflict, community relations and depriva-

tion in Northern Ireland, namely the Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission (1969–1974). Thus, most, if not all, of the leaders of the peacebuilding processes involving loyalist paramilitaries in the 2000s have been active at grassroots level in initiatives aimed at long-term peacebuilding. It must be stressed that, when trying to develop links with outside partners, loyalist leaders sought help from local community workers and not from public bodies promoting peace and cross-community work. This shows that despite benevolent messages of reconciliation being spread by bodies such as the Community Relations Council, mainstream peacebuilding programmes may bear some limitations as to their ability to reach out to isolated communities and their leadership. The examples depicted in this essay also demonstrate that it is important for some forms of marginalised leaderships to develop mechanisms favouring empowerment and self-help away from mainstream peacebuilding techniques.

In October 2006, loyalist leaders in the UDA and the UPRG organised an international conference in Belfast to announce openly the UDA's involvement in a conflict resolution process.<sup>57</sup> In October 2007, an event was organised in Belfast which marked a new stage in the process towards building up an embryonic conflict transformation process among loyalist leaders from the UDA and UPRG. Alan Bell, a local peacebuilding, business and community activist on the interface for many years, tells about the circumstances that contributed to generating a conflict transformation process:

I was approached in January 2007 by a man I have known for many years, Dr Joe Camplisson, who has been involved in conflict resolution work here, Palestine and Israel, Moldova and Transdnestrria, and more recently Armenia and Azerbaijan. He had been asked by some leading loyalists to assist them in their attempt to break away from their past as they were concerned about the effect that their actions had had and were still having on their communities.

At this time I was involved in organising a return visit by Tony Brown, an African American lecturer from the Mennonite College of Hesston University in Kansas. Tony, although a classically trained singer, discovered many years ago that the Spirituals have a wonderful effect on people and Tony sings these and speaks to them.

Dealings with the Loyalists in January 2007 were all hush hush but it was considered that quite possibly by the time of Tony's proposed visit in October 2007, things would have moved on sufficiently to contemplate a gathering at Taughmonagh Social Club to which Republicans could be invited (Taughmonagh is a large Loyalist housing estate). The decision was taken to go with that idea and to engage Tony for the event. Our great local singer, songwriter and peace activist, Tommy Sands was also engaged.<sup>58</sup>

The event organised in October 2007 was considered a success because organisers managed to assemble people from different backgrounds: there were republicans, ex-prisoners from both sides, former combatants, politicians,

community workers and church/media/government representatives. Besides, those attending the event were eager to repeat the experience. A formal group came out of that, called the Standing Northern Ireland Peacebuilding Process (SNIPP). Their aims were thus described by Joe Camplisson in April 2008: 'SNIPP is the cornerstone of a local community orientated self help attempt at ending sectarian conflict and its causes. It is an inter-denominational, cross/cultural component within a MICOM facilitated Community Development strategy aimed at conflict resolution.'<sup>59</sup>

From an organisational point of view, SNIPP did not follow a clear pattern of development and was commanded by no definite structure. The loose constitution of the process implied constant organisational evolution. The process existed as long as key members remain involved in it, key members being members of the UDA, UPRG, MICOM, Conflict Transformation Initiative, Taughmonagh Social Club, Dublin Busmen, Ainsworth Community Association and the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). They were staunchly committed to setting up a process of some sort which would help loyalist leaders in the UDA and UPRG to enhance their organisational skills. They also wanted to make the process viable in the long term and were looking for ways of piloting it. Joe Camplisson stressed that 'event funding to date has been piecemeal'<sup>60</sup> as costs were usually absorbed by representatives from the groups aforementioned.<sup>61</sup> There were some peripheral members of the process whose participation was sought after: government representatives, members of the republican community and members of the community in general (community workers, civil servants, political activists and so on). If the focus was on 'political' peacebuilding, the UDA and UPRG also launched a 'social' programme to address specific issues affecting marginalised loyalist communities. Vulnerable people such as young people and those living at interface areas were to be assisted in developing their organisational skills in order to learn how to address their difficulties. Empowerment and social improvement were at stake.

By engaging in peacebuilding processes designed by themselves, the loyalist leaders were addressing the issues of social exclusion and violence. They were thus playing an important role in rendering aggressive mechanisms such as rioting obsolete by providing alternative forms of action.

## Assessment

Different as they were in shape, the initiatives launched separately by the two loyalist groups shared a certain number of identical features. For instance, they were supported by community groups whose work was respected by the loyalist leaders. A trusting relationship enabled them to launch new modes of action implying collaboration with outside partners. It is important to stress that loyalist leaders in the UVF and the UDA sought help from community

groups whom they trusted. This rapprochement led the loyalist leaders to develop an elaborated philosophical discourse on their method. For instance, loyalist activists involved in the EACTF initiative developed their own understanding of what peacebuilding encompassed. They advocated the method of conflict transformation (as opposed to conflict resolution), highlighting the fact that the cessation of violence did not necessarily entail peace. PUP representatives claimed that

Peace building for the genuine loyalist is not about achieving a result for loyalism through non-violent means. Nor is it merely about resolving conflict through the politics of non-violence. It is not even about achieving agreement through non-violent means. It is about seeking a commitment to developing creative alternatives to violence through dialogue with the enemy. It is crucial therefore that both current and former participants in the conflict are regarded as key resources in the peace building process. They are not mere recipients of imposed solutions but an essential part of the transforming, healing and restorative process. They must, however, be sincere in their desire for both non-violence and the democratic process.<sup>62</sup>

Regarding the theoretical background of the SNIPP initiative, its underpinning theory was based on John Burton's human needs theory.<sup>63</sup> According to this theory, ethno/religious/political conflicts arise from the denial and frustration of basic human needs. Basic needs can be related to identity issues and/or to social, economic, cultural, educational, health, political, environmental and security conditions. Those needs have to be addressed. Precisely, in Northern Ireland, there is a feeling that some questions have been left unanswered by the macro peacebuilding efforts. Here the new SNIPP initiative aimed at complementing existing peacebuilding advancements. In fact, it sought to address some tacit gaps in the understanding of what makes a resolution process efficient in the sense that it effectively addresses the problems and needs that nurture violent conflicts. In a recent conversation, Joe Camplisson highlighted 'the importance of having a comprehensive characterisation of the nature of that leadership which is instrumental in bringing countries into war, and generating movement toward internecine violent conflict'.<sup>64</sup> SNIPP was based on the belief that positive modes of action, based on development and change, would contribute to eradicating the underlying causes of conflict. This libertarian philosophical background revealed the importance of the contribution made by leaders from community groups. Thus, one might link the peacebuilding work depicted here with the successful decommissioning of weapons completed by loyalist groups in 2009 and 2010.

However, some observers might think, in a deterministic tone, that the modes of thinking and acting of loyalist leaders in Northern Ireland will not change, as they are inescapably shaped by past events and culturally inherited mindsets. On one previous occasion, following the strike organised in 1974 by the Ulster Workers' Council, leading members<sup>65</sup> of the UDA developed an interest for the work done by community activists.<sup>66</sup> At that time, they were

attempting to fortify their leadership in the community. But their interest in community work gradually waned and Nelson argues that it was only a calculated move.<sup>67</sup> Should the enthusiasm shown by loyalist leaders in the 2000s be seen as a tactical move to provide a new *raison d'être*? Or was it a genuine attempt at creating solid partnerships with the community sector? Those questions cannot be answered at this stage.

SNIPP and EACTF, as tools for change, could also be regarded as over-optimistic and dismissed as utopian. Being at the intersection of heterogeneous groups, social and/or identity differences stood as barriers to easy, flowing working relationships. For instance, SNIPP's work was slowed down by a series of disheartening circumstances. If the organisation of the first event happened without trouble, the second event, which was planned outside a loyalist area in the Sarsfield's GAA Club in January 2008, had to be brought back to loyalist Taughmonagh in May because of what Joe Camplisson describes as 'security fears'. A new event was then planned for September 2008, again in a nationalist area with people from Moldova joining in to give a presentation on the conflict with Transdnistria, accompanied by musicians. However, this event was cancelled as well. Alan Bell narrates the events leading to the cancellation:

On the morning of 17th September, the day of the Sarsfield event, an article appeared in the Irish News giving notice of the event. It was to have appeared inside the paper, but instead, it was emblazoned across the front page: **'UDA boss' McDonald to speak at Belfast GAA club**. On seeing this, a few members of the GAA club cancelled the event, stating that the club had not been fully informed of its content. Although other members did not agree that this was correct, the event was nevertheless cancelled.<sup>68</sup>

This brings about many questions: Was this simply a series of unfortunate circumstances? Were some members of the community afraid of developing a mission of transformation in the loyalist areas? In the republican areas? Those questions remain unanswered but the events confirm that 'spoiler groups'<sup>69</sup> exist. It could also be assumed that resistance to change comes from outside institutions (media, churches, government, political parties or state intelligence services). Making the peacebuilding process last was a challenge facing SNIPP and EACTF. Some groups of people within loyalist communities most affected by the conflict did not want to see changes happening and would fight those changes. Reasons for this were varied. Seán Brennan assumes very accurately that 'some are crude sectarian views. Others fear that change will remove them from self appointed leadership or "gate keeper" roles in their community.'<sup>70</sup> Indeed, if the main force to an efficient peacebuilding effort lies within the grassroots activists, so do possibly its main detractors. Moreover, members of SNIPP and EACTF were mostly amateurs in the field of conflict resolution and conflict transformation. It was a learning curve, with its share of mistakes, frustration and disenchantment. All the same, SNIPP and EACTF

could become extinct if some of its leaders decided that they had nothing to gain from the process any longer.

Precisely, Joe Camplisson recently specified that some key members of SNIPP dropped and that his position as facilitator may no longer be tenable<sup>71</sup> Moreover, Kelly Haggarty indicated that she, 'and the original members of the EACTF Focus group and critical friends, have now left the project, as far as we are concerned it is dead'.<sup>72</sup> This is partly due to leadership issues within the local UVF group, who remained with no battalion commander for months. As a consequence, members of the paramilitary group started to withdraw from the EACTF and the rapprochement between all the different actors gradually disintegrated. But Kelly Haggarty lays emphasis on causes that are related to the question of power:

We were becoming a dangerous thing to the bureaucrats that had power, be that the police, security forces, politicians, civil servants or even other community groups or organisations. We had the hearts and minds of a certain constituency, and this scared the hell out of some people. We were giving a voice and a new-found sense of effectiveness to a once powerless and apathetic community.<sup>73</sup>

Interestingly, this shows that despite a general consensus on the necessity of encouraging peacebuilding at all levels, initiatives enhancing local empowerment do not receive systematic support from decision-makers.<sup>74</sup>

All in all, the difficulties underlined here shed light on the elusiveness of the task that was undertaken by SNIPP and EACTF alike. Numerous people in Northern Ireland have continually set to the task of bringing people together and changing modes of action and thinking, from political representatives in the government (who established the Community Relations Council in 1990) to grassroots activists who have unremittingly engaged in peacebuilding activities even at the height of the Troubles in the 1970s and 1980s. Few have attempted to engage former paramilitary leaders. SNIPP and EACTF were no straightforward answer to the difficulties depicted previously. The task at hand was big and the process complex. As peacebuilding initiatives, however, they contained some unprecedented advantages as they were based on the assumption that peacebuilding activities led at grassroots level could contribute to the stabilisation of peace. How so?

EACTF and SNIPP sought to transform the modes of action of those who participated in the conflict. As we have seen, in Northern Ireland, loyalist leaders in the UVF and the UDA tried since the mid-2000s, in two separate initiatives, to develop a process which would lead to responding to key issues through non-violent ways. The processes offered opportunities to find mechanisms that would help respond to their needs efficiently because they were wanted by, conducted by and aimed at the community which has suffered from the conflict and who once participated in it. In that regard, SNIPP and the EACTF implied many advantages for loyalist leaders who could discuss sensitive issues,<sup>75</sup> engage their communities in a process of development away



from traditional modes of violent action and thought and, eventually, spread a more positive image of loyalists in Northern Ireland. They offered innovative ways of accompanying and supporting the development of a solid loyalist leadership. This was in line with the theoretical approach of conflict transformation, which differs from more traditional 'conflict resolution' methods. It is considered that 'resolution' focuses on bringing the conflict to an end and deters initiatives of change. Conflict transformation, on the contrary, seeks to shed light on the elements that render a conflict violent. This understanding then permits those who were engaged in the conflict to find ways of transforming their role in the conflict into a more positive process leading to change in society. It has been noted that peacebuilding in loyalist spheres developed as a result of a process of rapprochement between loyalist paramilitary leaders and community groups. Loyalist leaders had much to gain from this collaborative work: it provided a means of maintaining a status of leadership in the community and, by helping devise a new project, dispensed a *raison d'être*. Through this transformation process the conditions which had given rise to violence were slowly being eliminated.

But this means that political, paramilitary and administrative groups must undergo structural changes. This remains a difficult, unnatural task to take on. For instance, the objectives of conflict transformation sometimes became secondary to loyalist leaders whose main preoccupations remained linked to security issues. Despite the declarations that their arsenal had been destroyed (the UVF's in June 2009 followed by the UDA's in January 2010), the issue of security has remained critical. Loyalist paramilitary leaders kept a prominent role in addressing it.<sup>76</sup> Despite recent peace agreements, successful decommissioning processes and the setting up of constitutional provisions in Northern Ireland, the situation is such that conflicts may arise at any time and at different scales, regional or national. Many members of SNIPP and EACTF have repeatedly stressed that peace remains fragile. In such circumstances, the help of loyalist leaders is requested at times when tensions are likely to lead to confrontations, particularly during the marching season. On such occasions, they act as mediators to try and marshal potential rioters. So, the question of defence still arises sporadically. Demilitarisation, slow-moving as it has been, has nonetheless led loyalists to framing differently their protective call to defend the interests of their community. Tools such as community development and conflict transformation, developed in collaboration with community activists, provided alternative modes of action which were considered accurate and effectual by some loyalists in the UDA and the UVF at a given time. The processes of conflict transformation depicted here arouse interest because of the commitment and hard work of those involved, and also due to the originality of the work that was undertaken with former paramilitary leaders. They will undoubtedly hold the attention of activists who are busy enhancing peace efforts in countries undergoing a situation of conflict elsewhere in the world.

But initiatives advocating structural change require strong support. My recent doctoral study on community relations programmes (1969–1998) showed that, since the 1970s, policy-makers in Northern Ireland generally tended to discard programmes or initiatives advocating structural change and preferred to focus on cultural transformation through educational programmes. The study concluded that peace efforts became less efficient if one of the two elements was dismissed.

Moreover, community-led peacebuilding initiatives such as EACTF and SNIPP focused on the understanding of conflict as it was felt and expressed by people who had been affected by it. Transformational processes favour participation from below. Such scholars and practitioners as Curle have come to realise that ‘it is essential to consider the peacemaking potential within the conflicting communities themselves’.<sup>77</sup> It seems necessary to help community leaders to design a process of conflict transformation that they will then lead. This is what John Paul Lederach calls ‘indigenous empowerment’.<sup>78</sup> This empowerment in a loyalist context in Northern Ireland might have led to strengthening a grassroots leadership and to mobilising it around the task of peacebuilding. Lederach<sup>79</sup> argues that traditionally peacebuilding was monitored by top- and middle-level leaders who saw grassroots leaders and their communities as ‘the problem’. The former considered themselves to be outsiders who designed solutions to the conflict affecting people ‘below’. But Lederach places grassroots leadership at the centre of peacebuilding and argues that solutions are more viable in the long term if they are indeed designed by people from below. This, however, remains difficult to grasp in Northern Ireland as local, regional or national forces act as ‘spoiler groups’ against the development of self-help initiatives aiming at building peace.

The study of the loyalist peace initiatives sheds light on some of the main shortcomings of the policy-making and peacebuilding frameworks in Northern Ireland. Since the 1970s, British policy-makers have tended to consider that peace would develop somehow naturally in Northern Ireland when political representatives from antagonistic groups would manage to share power in a regional assembly. Basically, in a pragmatic way, it was thought that peace would develop indirectly from political agreements between rivals. To that end, in the 1990s and 2000s, *peacebuilding* policies have tended to serve the political motive of furthering *peacemaking* efforts. That is one of the reasons why, feeling that they were being manipulated, some sections of the Northern Irish community grew suspicious of official programmes promoting reconciliation and preferred to work in collaboration with community leaders in the field of peacebuilding. But transformational work undertaken by grassroots activists has been considered at best as secondary, at worst as suspicious by decision-makers because of their appraisal of the notion of empowerment. This, in turn, has tended to further ostracise those at the margins. Consequently, the peacebuilding policies have generated paradoxical effects. Moreover, it appears that the notion of balance between the different actors

contributing to peace (high, middle and low ranges) remains an illusion, as initiatives emanating from independent sources – that is, not controlled by policy-making infrastructures – are clearly undervalued. This imbalance might explain why the peace process in general lacks efficiency and how it might even nurture the conflict, albeit indirectly.

## Notes

- 1 The author wishes to thank the members of SNIPP for their participation in this project (in particular Joe Camplisson, Alan Bell and Seán Brennan) as well as Kelly Haggarty (née Robinson), who is the former coordinator of EACTF.
- 2 R. Wilson, 'Northern Ireland: Guns, Words and Publics', 16 March 2009, [www.opendemocracy.net/article/northern-ireland-guns-words-and-publics](http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/northern-ireland-guns-words-and-publics) (accessed 22 November 2010).
- 3 R. Wilson and Wilford, *A Route to Stability: The Review of the Belfast Agreement* (Belfast, 2003), 11.
- 4 The author makes a distinction between the processes of *peacemaking* and *peacebuilding*. Peacemaking is the process of shaping a settlement between disputing parties. Negotiations and third-party mediation are used to reach peace agreements. This must be followed by long-term peacebuilding – the process of reconciliation.
- 5 U. Hansson, *Troubled Youth? Young People, Violence and Disorder in Northern Ireland* (Belfast, 2005), 27.
- 6 M. Leonard, *Children in Interface Areas: Reflections from North Belfast* (Belfast, 2004), 105.
- 7 Leonard, *Children in Interface Areas*, 44.
- 8 Recently, in 2009 and 2010, dissident Republican groups launched attacks on Army barracks and against officers of the Northern Ireland's reformed police.
- 9 See S. McAlister, P. Scraton and D. Haydon, *Childhood in Transition: Experiencing Marginalisation and Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Belfast, 2009).
- 10 Despite Lederach's recommendation that initiatives from the grassroots, middle range and top level complement each other. See J. P. Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC, 1997), 84.
- 11 A process of transformation might focus on two different objects: culture or structure. Cultural change encompasses working on such issues as identity, social relationships and perceptions of self and others. Structural change will deal with political mechanisms (or modes of action), structures (structures enabling participation for instance) and the issue of leadership. See, for instance, D. Bloomfield, *Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland, Building Complementarity in Conflict Management Theory* (Basingstoke, 1997), 93.
- 12 Jim Fitzpatrick, proprietor of the *Irish News*, since 1983, interviewed by the author (28 September 2005). Leading members of the Community Relations Commission (1969–1974) also arranged secret gatherings for paramilitary leaders (author's interview with Hywel Griffiths, 8 April 2005). See also the report of such a gathering: Community Conference Council 1974, *Report on Port Salon Conference 13<sup>th</sup>, 14<sup>th</sup>, 15<sup>th</sup> September, 1974* (Belfast, September 1974, unpublished).
- 13 The predecessor of the UPRG emerged in 1978 as the New Ulster Political Research Group. This political think tank was established by the UDA to reflect on the development of their political views.

- 14 The UDA and the UVF were set up under different circumstances and by different people. On the one hand, the UVF emerged in 1966 in the face of an alleged threat of a republican upheaval in Northern Ireland in the year of the fiftieth commemoration of the 1916 Easter Rising and also because Unionist Prime minister O'Neill was considered too liberal. See S. Bruce, *The Edge of the Union, the Ulster Loyalist Political Vision* (Oxford, 1994), 4. On the other hand, the UDA was set up in 1971, at a time when a major crisis had developed in Northern Ireland with people demanding equal civil rights for all and criticising the unfair policies of the Unionist parliament. This caused mayhem on the streets. It is in that specific context that the UDA emerged. At the beginning, groups of people started to assemble in their areas to protect the community. They were called vigilante groups. See S. Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders, Protestant Political, Paramilitary and Community Groups and the Northern Ireland Conflict* (Belfast, 1984), 82. Vigilante groups progressively became better organised and eventually merged into a unique group in 1971. This was the UDA. The idea of protecting and defending one's community was at the heart of their motivations.
- 15 See Graham Spencer, 'The Decline of Ulster Unionism: The Problem of Identity, Image and Change', *Contemporary Politics* 12.1 (2006), 45–63, and *The State of Loyalism in Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke, 2008).
- 16 On loyalists' historical mistrust of unionist political leaders, see Bruce, *The Edge of the Union*; Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders*; Peter Shirlow and Mark McGovern (eds), *Who Are 'The People'? Unionism, Protestantism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland* (London, 1997); and Susan McKay, *Northern Protestants: An Unsettled People* (Belfast, 2000).
- 17 Seán Brennan, community development worker, in an interview with the author (5 November 2008) and a series of e-mails with the author since then. He is employed by Intercomm in North Belfast and is a member of the North Belfast Conflict Transformation Forum.
- 18 Since the 1970s, loyalist leaders have repeatedly sought to transform loyalism into a consistent movement with its articulate political and social credo. But loyalist attempts to gain political representation have failed. For further developments, see D. Miller, *Queen's Rebels: Ulster Loyalism in Historical Perspective* (Dublin, 1978); A. Edwards and S. Bloomer, *A Watching Brief? The Political Strategy of Progressive Loyalism since 1994* (Conflict Transformation Series, 8; Belfast, 2004). For more details, see J. W. McAuley, 'Whither New Loyalism? Changing Loyalist Politics after the Belfast Agreement', *Irish Political Studies* 20.3 (2005), 323–40; A. Edwards and S. Bloomer (eds), *Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland: From Terrorism to Democratic Politics* (Dublin, 2008); and G. Spencer, *The State of Loyalism in Northern Ireland*.
- 19 Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders*, 136.
- 20 Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders*, 181–92.
- 21 See A. Edwards, 'Abandoning Armed Resistance? The Ulster Volunteer Force as a Case Study of Strategic Terrorism in Northern Ireland', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 32.2 (2009), 325.
- 22 See Edwards and Bloomer, *A Watching Brief?*
- 23 McAuley, 'Whither New Loyalism?', 325–26.
- 24 Spencer, *The State of Loyalism in Northern Ireland*, 246.
- 25 Some dissident republicans reject the Good Friday Agreement and hold an uncompromising stance on the objective of Irish unity and independence. They assemble in two paramilitary organisations called Real Irish Republican Army and Continuity Irish Republican Army. They are still active.
- 26 European Commission, *EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern*

- Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland 2000–2006, Operational Programme (Brussels), Chapter 6.6, 114.
- 27 See Edwards, 'Abandoning Armed Resistance?'; McAuley, 'Whither New Loyalism?'; Edwards and Bloomer (eds), *Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland*; Spencer, *The State of Loyalism in Northern Ireland*; and C. Mitchell, 'The Limits of Legitimacy: Former Loyalist Combatants and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland', in *Irish Political Studies* 23.1 (2008), 1–19.
- 28 Ulster Defence Association, *Remembrance Day Statement*, 11 November 2007, [www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/uda/uda111107.htm](http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/uda/uda111107.htm) (accessed 28 March 2010).
- 29 For further details, see East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum's website at <http://changeeastantrim.org/background.html> (accessed 16 March 2011); Aaron Edwards and Stephen Bloomer, 'Democratising the Peace in Northern Ireland: Progressive Loyalists and the Politics of Conflict Transformation', [http://www.linc-ncm.org/CTP\\_12.pdf](http://www.linc-ncm.org/CTP_12.pdf) (accessed 8 June 2009); and Edwards, 'Abandoning Armed Resistance?'
- 30 Edwards, 'Abandoning Armed Resistance?', 156.
- 31 East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum, [www.linc-ncm.org/old/eactf.html](http://www.linc-ncm.org/old/eactf.html) (accessed 17 March 2010).
- 32 The statement is mentioned and described in Community Think Tanks Project, *Conflict Transformation Initiative, Loyalism in Transition: 1, A New Reality?* (Island Publications, 79; Newtownabbey, 2006), 7.
- 33 Community Think Tanks Project, *Conflict Transformation Initiative*.
- 34 Community Think Tanks Project, *Conflict Transformation Initiative*, 19–22.
- 35 Author's interview with Seán Brennan, 5 November 2008.
- 36 On the constructive role of ex-prisoners in peacebuilding, see K. McEvoy and P. Shirlow, 'Re-Imagining DDR: Ex-Combatants, Leadership and Moral Agency in Conflict Transformation', in *Theoretical Criminology* 13 (2009), 31–59; and P. Shirlow, B. Graham, K. McEvoy, F. Ó hÁdhmaill and B. Purvis, *Politically Motivated Former Prisoner Groups: Community Activism and Conflict Transformation* (Belfast, 2005).
- 37 Progressive Unionist Party, *Principles of Loyalism, An Internal Discussion Paper* (Belfast, 2002), 43.
- 38 531 million Euros were provided by the European Commission: *EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation. Annual Implementation Report 2004* (Belfast, 2005), 4. The amount was topped up by British and Irish governments according to the principle of additionality.
- 39 Trutz Haase, *Community Uptake Analysis of Peace II* (Belfast, 2005), 8.
- 40 Nationalists receive 51.4 per cent of approved funding and Unionists 48.6 per cent. This does not necessarily mean that there is a bias in the distribution of funds in favour of Nationalists. According to a study on differentials in community uptake, Nationalists are generally more deprived and tend to apply for funds more readily. See Haase, *Community Uptake Analysis of Peace II*, 7.
- 41 Interview with Seán Brennan.
- 42 Kelly Haggarty in a series of messages exchanged between January and April 2010. Kelly Haggarty, formerly coordinator of EACTF (2005–2009), is now employed by the Greater Shankill Partnership Board.
- 43 Quoted in Edwards, 'Abandoning Armed Resistance?', 158.
- 44 According to Billy Mitchell (former loyalist combatant and ex-prisoner) quoted by Edwards, 'Abandoning Armed Resistance?', 158.
- 45 Kelly Haggarty, Programme Co-ordinator EACTF 2005–2009, 'East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum Provide and Environment for Progressive Loyalism to Grow', <http://www.changeeastantrim.org> (accessed 9 June 2009).

- 46 East Antrim Conflict Transformation Forum, [www.linc-ncm.org/old/eactf.html](http://www.linc-ncm.org/old/eactf.html) (accessed 17 March 2010).
- 47 East Antrim Focus Group, 'Progress Report' (2006), [www.linc-ncm.org/old/focus.html](http://www.linc-ncm.org/old/focus.html) (accessed 17 March 2010).
- 48 According to Kelly Haggarty, the EACTF 'acted solely on a voluntary capacity'; however, the money that was already coming into the area was used to fund community development projects in the loyalist areas covered by the EACTF's strategy. Messages from Kelly Haggarty, January to April 2010.
- 49 East Antrim Focus Group, 'Progress Report'.
- 50 Members of the PUP have been responsible for developing a more 'political' form of peacebuilding. See Progressive Unionist Party, *Principles of Loyalism* and the website, [www.pup-ni.org.uk/home/](http://www.pup-ni.org.uk/home/) (accessed 21 November 2009).
- 51 Joe Camplisson, 'MICOM, UDA De-Militarisation Process Development' (Belfast, Farsset Community Development Project, 2006, unpublished).
- 52 Author's Interview with Joe Camplisson, 3 November 2008.
- 53 John Burton is an expert in conflict resolution. On 'assisted analysis', see J. Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism and War, The Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems* (Oxford, 1979), and for MICOM's experience in Moldova, see M. Hall and J. Camplisson, *From Conflict Containment to Resolution: The Experiences of a Moldovan-Northern Ireland Self-Help Initiative* (Newtownabbey, 2002).
- 54 Joe Camplisson, quoted in Farsset Community Think Tanks Project, *Conflict Resolution, the Missing Element in the Northern Ireland Peace Process* (Newtownabbey, 1999), 9.
- 55 See Community Think Tanks Project, *Conflict Resolution*.
- 56 Community Think Tanks Project, *Conflict Resolution*, 13.
- 57 See list of participants in Community Think Tanks Project, *Conflict Transformation Initiative, Loyalism in Transition: 2, Learning from Others in Conflict* (Newtownabbey, 2007), 4.
- 58 A. Bell, 'Report to Ulster Quarterly Peace Committee "Open Day" Gathering Held at South Belfast Meeting House', 11 October 2008, unpublished.
- 59 J. Camplisson, 'SNIPP Profile, Draft by Joe Camplisson', Unpublished, April 21 2008, 1.
- 60 E-mail message from Joe Camplisson, 13 November 2009.
- 61 The Community Relations Council also provided funding as well as Quaker groups (the Irish Quaker Faith in Action and the Robert and Kezia Stanley Chapman Trust), as stated by Bell in 'Report to Ulster Quarterly Peace Committee "Open day" Gathering'.
- 62 Progressive Unionist Party, *Principles of Loyalism*, 43–44.
- 63 John Burton developed an approach to conflict resolution based on the needs theory. Needs theory holds that deep-rooted conflicts emerge out of the denial of one or more basic human needs, such as security and identity. See J. Burton (ed.), *Conflict: Human Needs Theory* (London, 1990), and J. Burton and F. Dukes (eds), *Conflict: Readings in Management and Resolution* (London, 1990).
- 64 Interview with Joe Camplisson and a series of e-mails since then.
- 65 Such as Andy Tyrie and Glen Barr. See D. Anderson, *Fourteen May Days: The Inside Story of the Loyalist Strike of 1974* (Dublin, 1994).
- 66 Nelson, *Ulster's Uncertain Defenders*, 194.
- 67 *Irish Times*, 13 July 1976.
- 68 Bell, 'Report to Ulster Quarterly Peace Committee "Open day" Gathering'.
- 69 St Bloomer, 'Bridging the Militarist-Politico Divide: The Progressive Unionist Party and the Politics of Conflict Transformation', in Bloomer and Edwards (eds), *Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland*, 110.

- 70 Interview with Seán Brennan.
- 71 Joe Camplisson in a message dated 28 July 2010.
- 72 Messages from Kelly Haggarty, January to April 2010.
- 73 Messages from Kelly Haggarty, January to April 2010.
- 74 This was already the case in the 1970s when community development programmes encouraging self-help practices and community empowerment were regarded as highly suspicious by local and regional political representatives.
- 75 For example, workshops were organised by SNIPP focusing on Prejudice Reduction (October 2007 at Taughmonagh Social Club) and Transforming our Communities (May 2008 at Taughmonagh SC, too).
- 76 See N. Jarman, 'Ordering Transition: The Role of Loyalists and Republicans in Community-based Policing Activity', in Bloomer and Edwards (eds), *Transforming the Peace Process in Northern Ireland*, 133–47.
- 77 A. Curle, *Another Way: Positive Response to Contemporary Conflict* (Oxford, 1996), 96.
- 78 J. P. Lederach, *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures* (New York, 1995), 212.
- 79 Lederach, *Building Peace*.